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NARRATIVE ETHICS AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS 
James Wm. McClendon, Jr. 
Christian ethics, despite the qualifying adjective, "Christian," works a territory 
with no well-defined borders and no generally accepted organizing principle. I 
Catholic moral theology, for example, developed from the needs of church 
discipline and the confessional as those were defined by medieval canon law; it 
had frequent recourse to 'natural law .'2 Protestant ethics, on the other hand, has 
often been attracted by powerful philosophical currents in modem thought (Kan-
tian, or utilitarian, or phenomenological) and has sometimes been little more 
than a restatement of these. 3 Social ethics has its own history, having taken its 
rise (especially in America) from the young social sciences, adding to historical 
or sociological or economic data its intuitions in shaping action programs not 
especially notable for their theoretical coherence. Recent theological ethics (espe-
cially in Europe) has wavered between the attempt to find only revealed guidance 
for Christian conduct (Barth) and the attempt to relate itself to a world that is 
by definition not Christian, for this purpose employing 'orders of creation,' or 
(again) 'natural law. '5 
In this rather muddled situation, while no clear and common program of work 
appeared to draw the assorted Christian ethicists together, a common motif, 
decision-making, played a large role in one way or another in most of the camps 
just mentioned: Catholic moral theology issued in quasi-legal decisions sum-
marized in rules in confessors' manuals; utilitarian and Kantian and emotivist 
ethics in different ways emphasized the decisive role of the moral agent; social 
ethics strove to affect decision-making processes in civil society; and a theological 
ethicist such as Karl Barth was able to locate a "free and individual decision" 
between the constraints of Christian reflection and every moral act. 6 Christian 
ethics in our century became a theory of decisions, thereby lining up with trends 
in ethical reflection outside the Christian community. This had not been the 
focus either of classical philosophical or classical Christian ethics. 7 Yet the 
twentieth century Christian question was not whether ethics was about deciding, 
nor even what it meant to 'decide,' but merely on which grounds-natural law 
or revealed command, social program or deontological demand, situation or 
principle-the inevitable decisions were to be made. From the standpoint of 
decisionist Christian ethics, philosophy was expected to provide some satisfactory 
basis for Christian decision-making. For example, are Christians morally justified 
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in basing their decisions upon the will of God? Philosophy might also be asked 
to provide satisfactory universalization of the decision-making process. Can the 
decisions of Christians be universalized to become the decisions of aII the world? 
The trick was to answer yes to this question without depriving Christian ethics 
of its qualifying adjective, "Christian." 
The focus on decision was not without an interesting, if less well defined, 
encircling penumbra of other concerns. Among these, narrative, character, prac-
tices, and virtue have recently received special attention. 8 If these have not 
displaced the decisionist focus, they have at least softened or widened it. Moral 
decisions cannot be seen merely as the isolated acts of a natural (or rational, or 
society-regarding, or obedient) will; they must as well be seen as the display of 
character with its virtues and vices, or as the unfolding of an integral vision, or 
as participation in practices whose goals are the goods that the practices evoke-in 
a word, as elements of an ongoing narrative in whose episodes the moral agent 
is a character, and against whose setting the values of these decisions can be 
weighed. Insofar as the philosophical task had been seen in relation to free-
standing decisions, the new developments have provided a new philosophical 
task while foreclosing an old; there are no free-standing decisions; both justifi-
cation and rationalization must take place on a broader stage of action or not at all. 
Several sorts of objections to this revisionary program quickly arise and can 
as quickly be laid to rest; others are more serious. In the former category, it is 
easy, for example, to point out that Christian narrative ethics is not situation 
ethics, with its consequent (if misplaced) norm versus context debate. 9 
Situationism did indeed bring narratives into the discussion of moral decisions, 
but the narratives were usually cut to fit the dilemmas already perceived by the 
ethicist; biography was reduced to short story and short story to episode, while 
character was contracted to the episodic will of moral agents. 10 Situationism was 
no more engaged by the full Christian narrative than its parent utilitarianism had 
been. Likewise, Christian narrative ethics is not to be identified with the eccentric 
capers of some sorts of recent 'narrative theology' better left unnamed, with 
their blithe fondness for koans and parables, for autobiography and self-display, 
for sitting in a circle on the carpet and holding hands construed as theology. 
Insofar as it overlooks the likelihood of self-deception by each of us, as well as 
the demand of the Christian gospel for repentance and self-denial before the 
judge of all flesh, such bumptious 'theology' (or 'ethics') lies outside the scope 
of this essay. 
Save by derisive characterization, then, I will not explore here such alternatives 
to the Christian narrative ethics I have in mind. Instead, I will seek to define 
another sort of narrative ethics, show the sense in which it is ethics, and indicate 
some of the philosophical work that arises in connection with it, in contrast to 
the tasks that have arisen in connection with the decisionism of the last half 
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century. That there are also objections to narrative ethics of the sort I am interested 
in here will come out as we proceed; these objections will help to make clear 
the philosophical work needed. 
I 
Convictions are a characteristic feature of human beings, and unmistakably a 
feature of Christian religion." At least on outward view, Christians are human 
beings who acquire and live by Christian convictions. Convictions themselves 
may be distinguished from doctrines (doctrines at their nearest approach are the 
formal, conceptual restatement of convictions). 12 Convictions may also be distin-
guished from opinions. Opinions come and go, while our convictions are here 
defined as those tenaciously held beliefs or attitudes that constitute us the indi-
viduals (or the communities) that we are; convictions are not readily abandoned, 
and if we do give them up or change them, we are significantly different persons 
(or communities) than we were before. Since human beings are often inconsistent 
or erratic, and may even be perverse, we do not invariably express or live out 
our own convictions. Nevertheless, we do live them out most of the time--{)r 
else they are not ours, after all. 
It follows that convictions constitute an important interpretive nexus, linking 
actual life and moral theory, ethics and conduct. In fact, they may serve as the 
'propositional handles' by which ethicists grasp concrete human existence. Hence 
it is quite important to see that every conviction has a context, without which 
it cannot be understood at all. This is so commonplace a truth that it may easily 
be overlooked. For in understanding one another's convictions (or our own) we 
may and often do silently supply the necessary interpretive narratives. If for 
example we think that Admiral Mahan was convinced that America's security 
depended upon sea power, we supply more or less unrefiectively those American 
and naval narratives, the stories (myths, they may be) upon which we take the 
Admiral's conviction to depend; without such a narrative basis we might misun-
derstand "America's security depends upon sea power" to be about organic 
salt-water gardening, or about the aesthetics of marine oil paintings. Similarly, 
if we are to understand that Reinhold Niebuhr was convinced that original sin 
makes all our attempts at righteousness pretentious (and thus to some extent 
sinful), we must, in order to understand this conviction of his, not only supply 
the Christian narrative, and specifically that version of it that focuses upon the 
Fall; we must also have some sense of Niebuhr's place in modem religious 
history, his own story as part of the American church. That understanding does 
depend upon such narratives is a truism of those in the teaching professions-how 
else, in the classroom, do we make Niebuhr's guiding convictions plain to 
students? That we do not usually spell out our narrative knowledge at full length 
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is a daily mercy; that we could do so to the degree required is entailed in the 
claim to understand. 
That understanding requires a knowledge of context, most will grant, but is 
it correct that the context is necessarily a narrative context, when it comes to 
understanding convictions? This is indeed one of those places where the new 
developments invite new philosophical reflection: it is a question that, like the 
question how we can determine what the just mentioned "degree required" for 
understanding is, will engage us in what follows. 
One way of investigating these matters is speech-act theory. 13 Every utterance 
that we count as meaningful discourse (as illocution, not mere locution or sen-
tence-saying) is related to speaker and hearers (for convenience we can include 
writers among speakers, and readers among hearers), but also to the world in 
which the utterance is issued, and also to the language in which that utterance 
is formed, with its dictionary and grammar. This three-fold relation gives each 
utterance a three-dimensional force: (1) its affective or psychological force, as 
it is spoken by and to certain individuals with certain intentions, feelings, and 
attitudes; (2) its representative force, as it relates or in crucial ways fails to relate 
to the world external to itself; (3) its primary, or 'performative,'14 force, as it 
states or confesses or advises or promotes or proposes-its role as action, or in 
Austin's term, as "doing things with words." Linguistic failure, the failure to 
say anything, or to achieve illocutionary success, is a sufficiently common 
occurence that we can readily find instances of it. The failures occur in one or 
more of these three dimensions. So they will be either failure to mean what we 
say (cases of this being insincerity, or simple inattention to our own mouthings), 
or failure to stick with the way things are in the world in which we speak (e.g., 
mistakes), or failure to issue a speech-act that is suitable in the circumstances 
(e.g., purporting to promise when the speaker is in fact unable to promise, but 
at best in position only to wish for the desired outcome) or (worst case) failure 
to issue any speech-act at all. Or there can be mixed cases-the liar does not 
mean what he says, and does not stick with the way things are, but does issue 
a (lying) statement or report or explanation. Successful lying is therefore paradox-
icallya 'failure' in this technical sense; that it is a failure in another, moral sense 
is a different though I think related matter. 
Thus each of the elements of a speech-act, any speech-act, whether it be "I'll 
fail any student who turns in a paper that does not mention Quine" (spoken as 
a warning) or "Barbarians invading the Roman Empire provided a splendid new 
gene pool for the invigoration of Europe" (as an explanation) has a treble link 
to some narrative or narratives, so that our understanding of the speech-act in 
question is proportionate to our knowledge of, or capacity to supply, its relevant 
narrative background. For a speech-act cannot have an affective dimension save 
by being linked to the ongoing affects or feelings (intentions, drives, hopes, 
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fears, loyalties, loves, and the like) of some speaker and some hearer or hearers, 
and it cannot have a repre:.".Jtative dimension save by being linked to an ongoing 
world that is, at least in the cases we will be interested in, a human world that 
coheres as a world by means of its own narrative form, and it cannot have a 
primary dimension save by constituting action in the world, that is, by making 
a move in the world of which it is a part, and thus advancing the narrative of 
which it is a part as well. I think there are no exceptions; if there are some, say 
in mathematics or technical philosophy, they are not interesting exceptions for 
present purposes. The question, what exactly counts as a narrative here, must 
be addressed; it will be in what follows. Till then our concept of narrative can 
remain a minimal one, and no harm done. 
If now we accept that convictions, including Christian convictions, can be 
expressed in speech (to say that they can be is not to say that in a given case 
they have been), that is to say, convictions can be expressed in some speech-act 
or series of speech-acts, it follows from the previous paragraph that Christian 
convictions (among others) are all narrative-linked. Christian convictions, if they 
are genuinely Christian ones, will thus display an affective dimension that 
involves those affects in which those who participate in the Christian community 
have a share; they will also display a representative dimension that relates them 
to the world that Christ has redeemed (a truly human world, indeed), and they 
will display a primary dimension by being moves in the ongoing Christian story 
of which both the conviction and the speech-act that is its temporal expression 
are, in their respective ways, parts. 
All convictions bear upon what we are and what we do, and are thus in some 
sense moral, but Christian convictions include in their number explicit moral 
convictions as well: not only are there such as "Christ is the bearer of God's 
truth," but also "Christ is the paradigm of God's way"; not only "We believe 
in one God," but also "We must forgive our debtors." These are all (so far) 
successful candidates for convictional status in Christian communities; whether 
they are to remain so, if it is a live question, is one that Christian theology must 
address. Where Christian theology addresses moral convictions, it may be called 
moral theology or Christian ethics, just as when it addresses doctrinal convictions, 
it may be called doctrinal theology or Christian dogmatics. The point here is 
that moral convictions, like doctrinal ones, are narrative linked, not in the first 
instance by virtue of some unique feature of Christian morality (though it has 
unique features), but by virtue of being convictions. The unique features may 
provide other reasons why Christian convictions are necessarily linked to par-
ticular Christian narratives. It is enough to see here that by the mere fact of 
addressing convictional material, Christian ethics is narrative linked; that the 
narratives it confronts are the Christian ones follows from their content. Christian 
ethics must attend to these narratives to which the convictions themselves are 
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linked. To fail to attend to them is not just to give an incomplete or one-sided 
or partial account of Christian moral convictions; it is altogether to fail; it is to 
be in no position to understand them at all. Christian ethics, if it truly be without 
its own narrative, is no ethics at all, no understanding of moral convictions at all. 
II 
Now this is just the point that was to be made clear. I set out to say what was 
the relation between narrative ethics and Christian ethics, and I have made (as 
I see it, I have made good) the claim that Christian ethics is narrative ethics. 
We cannot speak of taking the way of the cross without evoking the passion 
story; we cannot speak of Christian justice in ways disconnected from the justice 
or righteousness Jesus' kingdom inaugurated; we cannot speak meaningfully of 
love in Christian terms, cannot produce a 'Christian ethic of love' apart from 
the long and haunting love story of God with his people Israel. By the nature 
of Christian convictions themselves, Christian ethics is linked to (at least one) 
narrative, and that narrative is the Christian story: the story of Israel, and of 
Jesus called the Christ, and of the church that followed him. 
It seems that the case is made, yet a profound disquiet may have set in. "What 
about the recent history with which you began? Weren't those non-narrative 
ethicists whom you scornfully labeled 'decisionists' doing ethics at all? Have 
they been defeated by a definition? Isn't that too easy a victory to claim?" And 
more perceptively, another voice: "I concede your claim that willy nilly, we all 
do our work as part of some history, our minds being in part formed by some 
(true or false) stories. But isn't that beside the point? Ethics is not the story of 
ethics any more than mathematics is the history of mathematics or philosophy 
the history of philosophy." This latter objection must be confronted; if possible 
it must be answered. In answering it, we may see more clearly what "Christian 
ethics" and "narrative ethics" have to do with (just plain) ethics. 
Let us state more fully the perceptive objection of the non-l1arrativist, repre-
senting as it is meant to do the various forms of decision ism in moral theology, 
and behind these, much modem moral philosophy. Remember that the claim I 
uphold is that Christian ethics is narrative ethics, that is, ethics that can only be 
understood in terms of the Christian narrative(s). The objection might go like 
this: l5 "Your account simply begs the question. Behind narrative ethics lies mere 
ethics. Now ethics is the statement and development of a theory of right and 
wrong, good and bad, the nature of persons, the place of decisions, and the like, 
together with the relations obtaining among these. Although any particular person 
may live in a community, and although as you say various communities have 
their stories, there is no story of persons, no story of human beings as such. An 
ethics that crucially depends on a narrative not only has to deal with the probable 
NARRATIVE ETHICS AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS 389 
falsity or incredibility of important parts of it (matters you neglected to mention); 
even if the narrative is in some sense true, the ethic dependent on it not only 
will commit the naturalistic fallacy, if it is a fallacy; worse still, it can never as 
such be more than the mores of that particular group. It can never delineate a 
true morality, except on the unlikely assumption that the whole human race finds 
itself in that one community. Even then, there would be a difference between 
that contingent fact and the claims of the moral point of view. True morality 
must be based on those logically necessary or empirically common features of 
all persons-such features as rationality, or freedom, or desire for pleasure. The 
fact that the parochial stories relate only contingently to our universal values (or 
principles, or categorical imperatives) is no weakness in the universals, any more 
than the existence of kangaroos only in Australia or polar bears only in the arctic 
betrays a weakness in the genetic laws. The stories are the local adaptations of 
the universal; ethics is not natural history; your account, while locally interesting, 
has missed the point of ethics." 
Here is a nest of troubles, certainly more than can be cleared up in a paper 
like this one, since some of them represent deep assumptions, conflicting with 
my own, that would require considerable digging merely to expose. 16 What can 
be done is to take up a couple of the non-narrativist's strongest claims, showing 
at least the first reply that narrative ethics will be constrained to make to these. 
Just by doing that, some light may be shed on the work philosophers now confront 
as a consequence of the (re)appearance of narrative ways of ethical reflection. 
The first, although not necessarily the most convincing, reply the narrative 
ethicist can make is a tu quoque: your work is as story-laden as is oursY You 
should acknowledge your own story before criticizing us for attending to ours. 
One element in your story, the story of modernity, is the dominance of the will. 
Already in the Renaissance, the will was perceived as a baleful threat to human 
well-being. Luther sought to deny it (no free will). Shakespeare dramatized its 
growth (ambitious Caesar, willful Lady MacBeth, malevolent Iago). Nietzsche 
was fascinated by it (der Uebermensch). William James chronicled its sickness 
and its health (Varieties). Good or bad, destiny or fate, the will is at the heart 
of your story, and ethical decisionism, like Minerva's owl, celebrates a story 
one surmises is nearing its end. In any case, decisionism has its (unacknowledged) 
story, too, and what it represents as being the concepts of pure freedom, pure 
utilitarian calculus, pure moral choice (at least in the original position) can rightly 
be comprehended only as abstractions of the story into your non-temporal prop-
ositions. 
But sophisticated decisionists are not likely to be persuaded by this tu quoque. 
They need not deny the facts in the record. They have only to deny that such 
facts as new modem interest in the will, or the rise of modem science, or the 
rise or decline of nationalism, constitute a story or narrative in any way relevant 
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to morality. The fact, they will say, is not relevant to ethics in the way that the 
Christian story is relevant to Christianity. For the fact is not a story. There is, 
they may say, a true account of the course of voluntarism in modem thought; 
it is no story, and to confuse even that account with their theories commits the 
genetic fallacy. 
I believe the objection to be well taken in its own terms. Indeed, it is time to 
say more exactly what is meant by narrative in "narrative ethics." Thereby we 
may eliminate loose verbiage and help focus debate. Henry James, in "The Art 
of Fiction," comes close to the center of the matter in a famous sentence: "What 
is character but the determination of incident? What is incident but the illustration 
of characterT18 So incident (or plot) and character (and its development) are 
interdependent narrative elements. If we add to these setting (which James cer-
tainly did not mean to omit) we have what some recent theorists take to be the 
necessary and sufficient ingredients of narrative. 19 Frank Kermode has nicely 
captured this in an illustration: to say, "the king died, and then the queen died" 
is not yet a narrative (though it may be a part of the mortuary table of a monarchy, 
and thus the setting of a narrative). But to say "the king died, and then the queen 
died of grief' is to tum the table into elemental narrative. 20 By adding to 
chronology and setting the ingredient of character (she was a woman whose grief 
would have such a consequence as this) the incident becomes plot, and we have 
all three elements. 
Now in this sense, and in their own terms, the non-narrativists are right: Their 
account of the place of voluntarism in their own theory will be no story, for it 
will lack plot and character; it will be mere incident in a setting (the Western 
world). For the narrativist, however, the 'account' is for that very reason defective 
as an account of what has happened: it fails to acknowledge the self-involving 
aspect of what has occurred, and thus fails to plot the course of the West in 
modem times. Distorting that account, moral theories become sterile because 
they are ignorant of their own roots; their rational abstractions constitute an 
ethnocentrism of pure intellect. As Stanley Hauerwas puts it, "We lose the ability 
to locate the history of which we are a part. "21 Morally speaking, that is a deadly 
loss. So there is disclosed here a deep difference between narrativist and non-nar-
rativist, about what matters, about what the truth of human beings consists in, 
about what there is in the world that morality must engage. It is just the sort of 
difference that should evoke the interest of moral philosophers, for we have no 
easy way, no non-philosophical way, to resolve it. 
III 
Narrativists insist on understanding the propositions of ethics and morality by 
means of stories with which the propositions are necessarily associated. For 
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instance, "You must love your neighbor as yourself' (Mark 12:31 and par.) may 
be regarded by a narrative ethicist as a distillation of Torah made by Jesus (and 
of course by others as well) for the purpose of displaying the intent of Torah in 
all its rich, narrative complexity. (And Torah itself, it will be remembered, is 
narrative law, a narrative morality: the very word torah means direction, as of 
a path, a way to be taken, a guide for the journey.) The giving of the Law in 
Exodus does not just incidentally appear in a narrative setting (Exodus 1-19).22 
The instruction for explaining its meaning to younger generations (Deuteronomy 
6:20-25) is not just incidentally the instruction to retell that very story. Jesus' 
two-fold summary of the Law, a part of which I have just quoted, must be 
understood both in the context of his ministry (and the evangelists' account of 
it) and in the wider context of the Hebraic narratives of which it is a focal 
portion. Non-narrativists, though, must insist that these associations are no part 
of the moral meaning of the propositions of morality, no part of ethics proper. 
For what if the stories with which the Law, or the Great Commandment of Jesus, 
are associated, tum out to be false, or in any case cannot be shown to be true, 
so that some will wish to discard or ignore them? Would not, should not "Love 
your neighbor as yourself' still rest secure on ethical grounds alone? If it is thus 
separable, are the stories not dispensable, mere illustration, mere homiletics? 
But if it and others are not, should not they be replaced with genuine ethical 
propositions-the Golden Rule with the categorical imperative; the injunctions 
of Jesus with the utilitarian calculus, perhaps? 
To this line of objection the narrativist has two responses. One is to tum again 
to speech-act theory. If the categorical imperative is seriously advanced by 
someone as an ethical principle, then it is someone' s act of speaking or speech-act. 
As such, it is subject to the categories of interpretation that any speech-act is. 
It has its affective force, and the affectivity of speaker and hearer is involved, 
and so on through the dimensions of speech action, each of which is narrative 
involving. To deny this is to remove the principle from the sphere of language 
and to claim immunity from the tests of meaning (and meaningfulness) that apply 
to all the rest of our speech. To acknowledge it is to anchor the principle firmly 
in the speaker's history, and more generally in the history of the community of 
speakers who acknowledge the Kantian heritage, do their work as its heirs, 
understand one another in its terms. In a word, it is to acknowledge as crucial 
to the meaning of their principle the story-like background from which the 
principle reappears when it is now employed. It is also to acknowledge the close 
links between that story and the Christian story that was Kant's own acknow ledged 
heritage. 23 
The other response is a broader one. It is to point out that what narrativists 
and non-narrativists disagree upon here can be expressed as a broader difference 
in the understanding of ethics and of morality itself. The non-narrativists (as I 
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have represented them) are at pains to limit morality to certain acts of the will, 
to decisions, and ethics to the rule or principle to which these acts must as they 
believe conform. The narrativists challenge the limitation of morality to such 
episodic elements because they cannot see these separated from the wider currents 
of human life. Their scale is different. Non-narrativist focus on decisions can 
be understood, in these terms, as a choice of focal length by which to observe 
human conduct. Seen through a decisionist lens, decisions stand out in sharp 
focus and all else is blurred, or framed out. The narrative ethicist will call 
attention to the other photographer's imposed focus and will show how much 
clearer the scene appears when viewed through a different photo apparatus. It 
will not do here, however, simply to invoke 'reality' over against the non-nar-
rativist; the narrative focus is also a focus, also a selection of apparatus and its 
use, also a way (and not just the way) of seeing the whole. Here, too, the picture 
is deliberately framed, and presumably there is something (decisions?) beyond 
the frame, or within it but left blurred. So the two photographic styles appear 
side by side, and there is so far no way to say that one is just right, the other 
just wrong. Certainly we can criticize one for not showing us what the other 
does, not knowing what the other is up to, but that is a criticism that might in 
one case or another cut either way. 
When we reach this stage of the matter, though, narrative ethics has gained 
its point. For now all sides say it is a matter of focus, say that there is perhaps 
more to the picture. For narrative ethics (as I have construed it) never wanted 
to deny that people decide, or that their decisions are sometimes morally signif-
icant, or that those significant decisions might be framed by rules or principles 
of so high a degree of abstraction that they would no longer have the appearance 
of narrative summaries. It only wanted to insist that the principles, even such 
principles as the principle of utility or the categorical imperative, have a context, 
as do the decisions they are meant to guide, only to insist that that context is a 
narrative one, and that the meaning of both the propositional principles adopted 
and the decisions these are meant to guide is to be found in terms of their 
narrative setting. The narrative ethicist can even concede that the best workers 
in the field, though embracing decisionist techniques of one sort or another, 
have always known this; good casuists have known how to include the full story, 
good deontologists and utilitarians and phenomenologists have, too. In this way 
narrative ethics could be seen as a corrective, helping those in other ethical 
traditions to live up to the highest potential of their own work. 
Still, that does not exhaust the matter. The conflict is not so easily resolved. 
Narrativists can make room for non-narrativists (it's a matter of focus); non-nar-
rativists can acknowledge narrativists (the stories make good illustrations of what 
we say). Yet neither side is likely to be satisfied with the other's' inclusiveness. ' 
It appears that here, too, more work remains to be done. The new question, as 
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I see it, has to do with scope or scale: What is the appropriate center of moral 
and ethical attention, and what is the fitting context for that center? Stated in 
this way, it seems to be an aesthetic question, calling for judgment more like 
that demanded of artists or architects than, say, machinists or engineers. To the 
extent that ethics engages narratives, it returns to a sphere in which artistry is 
indeed called forth, and artistic criticism must follow if the ethical 'artist' is to 
be held to standards of judgment and fittingness and coherence-to moral beauty 
as well as moral truth. 
It is from this angle that response should be made to the charge that the 
narrativist has made morality contingent upon stories that may tum out to be 
false. Indeed any failing of the story on which moral meaning depends does, 
and should, call its contained morality into question. We require of the stories 
we live by that they be in some sense true. Whether the narrativist works in a 
mythic tradition, whose stories have the 'truth' of myth, or in an historic tradition 
(such as I take Christianity to be 24) whose stories claim the truth of history, the 
truth of the story is just another side. of the truth of the morality it embodies. 2; 
IV 
The territory of truth seems to provide narrative ethics with both its deepest 
pitfalls and its most inviting avenues. Among the inviting avenues, there is the 
relation of truth to truthfulness. Perhaps it will be helpful to unfold this relation 
by recalling one of the moral narratives of the Hebrew Bible, II Samuel 12:1-15. 
The passage relates the confrontation of King David by the Prophet Nathan; its 
well-known centerpiece is Nathan's parable of two men who owned livestock, 
one having many flocks and herds, the other a single ewe lamb. 
As the interview begins, its ostensible topic is a just king's quest for truth. 
To be sure, the previous paragraph in II Samuel has just revealed that this King 
had his foibles, but it is a commonplace that public and private morality are 
separable and must of course be separated. Here then the reader will see the 
public figure at his public task: discerning the truth that justice demands. How 
excellent that Nathan has turned informant! Surely this is a prophet's proper 
place, to be the state's moral agent and detective, the King's right arm? So who 
is the rich culprit? But Nathan's reply turns the tables, deflates the royal pretense, 
demands truthfulness as the price of truth. The hunter is now the hunted; the 
hound a hare. 
Two other, more shadowy, figures hover outside the margins of this story and 
the other stories that constitute the books named Samuel. One is the (implied) 
narrator who has arranged the narrative as just described, set a trap with the 
narrative in somewhat the same way that Nathan set his within the story. The 
other shadowy figure is the (prospective) reader, in the present instance myself, 
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who has the opportunity as reader to be confronted with the claim of truthfulness 
just as he supposed he was confronting the claim of (objective, manageable) 
truth. That is, to the extent that I am able to accept the invitation of this chain 
of narratives in II Samuel and identify with their chief character, David the King, 
I find myself also forced to make the painful shift from a focus on mere truth 
(elusive though objective) to a more difficult focus on truth reached by way of 
truthfulness. Moral narrative here becomes for me moral formation. There is the 
story in the text, but there is also the story of the text, the engagement of narrator 
(or Narrator?) and reader by means of the offered story. 
Another aspect of this story is its setting-not merely the ancient Near East, 
though that has its relevance, too, but the setting in the biblical Israel in which 
narrator and reader are quite likely caught up in some fashion, as are David and 
Nathan (and the parabolic rich man and poor man). What difference does it make 
that this community is Israel, the people of a well-remembered exodus from 
tyranny, the people of the Law, the people among whom God may allow kings 
but, more to his purpose, raises up prophets? We may answer by imagining 
these events translated into the courts of the royal tyrant Tiglath-Pileser. In this 
imagined revision, the prophet appears, the "thou art the man" is spoken, the 
King's anger flares-off with his head. That in the biblical story the outcome 
is instead remorse, repentance, divine punishment, divine forgiveness (II Samuel 
12:13-25) is not only revealing of the character of David, but also of the commu-
nity setting in which such character can appear and flourish and be celebrated. 
As to the hint above that the narrator or ostensible teller of these tales is none 
other than God, so that God is not only a character in the biblical stories (appear-
ing, withdrawing, called JHWH, capable of jealousy, etc.) but also the implied 
teller of the stories, it cannot be explored here (as it is at least briefly explored 
in Brian Wicker's suggestive essay The Story-Shaped Worllp6). Yet this much 
can be said: if God is one who shapes our moral lives by telling us stories within 
a story-formed community, then we may require a rather different view of God 
than that suggested by metaphors of Command (Barth, Brunner) or of the Lure 
of all possible occasions (Whitehead); the God of biblical morality is more 
intimate than a Commander will be; more complex than the eternal processive 
Lure. But that is another (and another sort) of philosophical-theological inquiry. 
To link God and morality to a certain set of stories is also to raise problems 
of pluralism or relativism-pluralism if we are optimistic about the direction 
being taken, relativism if we are not. If the truth of morality and ethics is bound 
to these stories, does not its truth depend upon theirs? But how can it, if the 
moral is the universal, and if relativism entails moral chaos? Narrative modes 
are not alone in evoking relativistic (or fideistic) worries; on the other hand, it 
is possible that they may provide fresh ways of addressing them. In any case, 
it is evident that since the threats of relativism and fideism are not unique to 
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narrative ethics, banishing narrative cannot evaporate them. The hope is rather 
that narrative thinking may offer fresh insight into what is in any case an elusive 
set of problems of modem thought. At least it is down these lines that I would 
wish to address them. 
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